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Cultural pathways and pitfalls in South Africa: a reflection on 
moral agency and leadership from a Christian perspective 
The nature and importance of moral agency for the trans-
formation of persons and society, particularly from a Christian 
perspective, are discussed in this article. The focus is on 
cultural pathways and pitfalls with respect to the formation and 
exercise of moral agency on the part of individuals, leaders and 
communities. The six dimensions of cultural values as de-
veloped by Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000) are used 
as a framework to describe and evaluate mainly western and 
African cultural values in order to identify ways of developing 
moral responsibility and genuine social transformation. 
Opsomming 
Kulturele paaie en slaggate in Suid-Afrika: ’n refleksie oor 
morele bemiddeling en leierskap vanuit ’n Christelike 
oogpunt 
Die aard en belangrikheid van morele bemiddeling vir die trans-
formasie van persone en die samelewing as ’n geheel word 
veral vanuit ’n Christelike perspektief bespreek. Hierdie artikel 
fokus op kulturele paaie en slaggate met verwysing na die 
vorming en uitoefening van morele bemiddeling deur individue, 
leiers en gemeenskappe. Die ses dimensies van kulturele waar-
des, soos deur Hampden-Turner en Trompenaars (2000) ont-
wikkel is, word as ’n raamwerk gebruik. Veral die Weste en 
Afrika se kulturele waardes word hiermee beskryf en geëva-
lueer sodat maniere geïdentifiseer kan word om morele 
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verantwoordelikheid te ontwikkel en ware sosiale transformasie 
te bewerkstellig. 
1. Introduction 
In this article I seek to address the ancient and contemporary human 
necessity to form individuals and leaders of good character and 
communities in which moral values such as justice, generosity, re-
conciliation and peace are prominent features. Whether one is 
speaking of Africa or Australia, Lilongwe or London, wherever in-
justice, avarice, conflict and violence abound, the lives of people will 
be destroyed and the communities in which we live will be places of 
tears and conflict. The gap between the rich and the poor will widen, 
the environment will be further degraded and social unrest and 
conflict will deepen. This is certainly not a vision that one can look 
upon with glad anticipation. 
Other writers have discussed ethical choices in relation to the for-
mation of character in the context of community (Connors & McCor-
mick, 1998), moral dialogue and formation (Van der Ven, 1998) and 
conscience (Curran, 2004). Elsewhere I have analysed moral and 
spiritual formation in some detail (Kretzschmar, 2006; 2007) and 
noted the differences between Christian and other approaches to 
moral formation and agency (Kretzschmar, 2008). The focus of this 
article is to identify cultural pathways and pitfalls in terms of moral 
agency for individual people, leaders and communities. The model 
of cultural value preferences as developed by Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars (2000) is used to identify ways in which western and 
African cultures both enable and prevent moral agency from being 
exercised in society.  
2. Ethics, morality and moral agency 
2.1 Definitions of ethics and morality 
Within moral philosophy and the human sciences generally, ethics is 
understood to be a critical reflection on the attitudes, interactions, 
decisions and actions of human beings. For example, Van der Ven 
(1998:8-21), influenced by Paul Ricoeur, asks which actions can be 
regarded as good, right and wise. Human actions include both inter-
personal relationships and far-reaching social interactions such as 
conflicts, legislation, political governance, the activities of non-
governmental agencies, and the impact of corporations.  
L. Kretzschmar 
Koers 75(3) 2010:567-588  569 
Christian ethics both incorporates and critiques other understand-
ings of ethics, based upon its distinctive Christian framework or pa-
radigm drawn from the Bible, tradition, reason, the work of the Holy 
Spirit and experience – influenced by the cultures of its interpreters 
and practitioners. It is guided by norms and visions which may be 
similar to other ethical approaches (e.g. a longing for justice) and 
different (e.g. in its view of what justice is and how it may be rea-
lised). In situations of moral complexity, moral wisdom and discern-
ment are required. Christian ethics is both deductive (moral norms 
and convictions need to be understood and applied) and inductive 
(Christians need to learn from their own experiences and be chal-
lenged by the experience and critiques of others, especially those 
from outside their own social circle).  
The Christian moral life, then, is a life-long process of formation or 
sanctification. It is an invitation to be empowered by the living God to 
love one’s neighbours, and it includes repentance, discipleship and 
a prophetic witness (Connors & McCormick, 1998:225-246). It is 
about becoming good persons and moral communities who are able 
to choose rightly and to live a good life. Christian ethics is concerned 
with moral reflections and analyses, personal motives and inten-
tions, convictions and character, choices, actions and lifestyle. 
Therefore, morality must not be confused with narrow-minded, spirit-
deadening moralism, well illustrated in the film, As it is in heaven 
(2004) directed by Kay Pollak. A moral life, typified in the life of 
Jesus, is challenging and life-changing. Paradoxically, true morality 
is costly, yet life-giving. It draws the human spirit towards the Spirit 
of God and restores the God-given humanity of individual persons. It 
brings forgiveness and renewal to families, reconstruction to com-
munities, and justice to society. Without morality, deceit, selfishness 
and hatred destroy relationships and tear to shreds the fragile fabric 
of human societies.  
2.2 What is moral agency?  
A central locus of moral agency is the consciousness, character, 
choices and lifestyle of the individual. In their book entitled, The 
Bible & ethics in the Christian life, Birch and Rasmussen (1989:39) 
stress both character formation (an ethics of being) and moral deci-
sion making and action (an ethics of doing). Together with a com-
pelling moral vision, these constitute moral agency.  
But, because moral consciousness, character, choices and lifestyle 
are formed in community, and because moral vision and agency re-
quire both individual and communal inspiration and application, com-
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munity life forms a second locus of moral agency. The communities 
in which individuals live can encourage the development of moral 
agency (e.g. participation in a poverty alleviation program) or result 
in moral degradation (e.g. becoming a member of a drug cartel). Mo-
ral agency begins to emerge when individuals commit themselves to 
a process of moral formation (so that goodness is incarnated in 
them) and when they join or form groups which expect moral 
responsibility from them. In short, individuals both influence the mo-
rality of the group and are formed by being accountable to the 
group. When both moral individuals and communities are guided by 
a moral vision and seek to do what is right, moral agency begins to 
operate and take effect in society. For Christians, as noted below, 
relation to God is not simply a third locus, but the foundation of 
moral agency.  
Thus, the interplay between personal moral formation and commu-
nal moral regeneration is a complex one. It is true that the moral 
regeneration of society is dependent on the moral formation and 
agency of individuals. Equally, social circumstances and events can 
impede or encourage personal moral formation. Further, the moral 
formation of individuals occurs within the context of community, as 
human beings are “persons-in-community” (Nicolson, 2008:1-14).  
In England, for example, individuals such as William Wilberforce and 
Thomas Clarkson joined an Anglican evangelical group called the 
Clapham Set. This group, together with many other individuals and 
churches combined to fight for the abolition of slavery in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Closer to home, many in-
dividuals including prominent ones such as Nelson Mandela, Des-
mond Tutu, Albertina Sisulu and Beyers Naude, and groups (e.g. the 
African National Congress, trade unions and the member churches 
of the South African Council of Churches) combined to resist and 
overthrow apartheid.  
These individuals and groups were moral agents in their societies. 
This does not mean that all their contemporaries regarded them in a 
positive light, nor does it mean that they will be judged by history as 
having been morally good or right in every respect. But they were 
moral agents in the sense that they sought to move an entire society 
in a new direction, based on a moral vision. With regard to slavery, 
the moral vision was that of the equality of humanity. Echoing 
Christian values, the slogan “Am I not a man and a brother?” was 
adopted first by the Society of Friends (the Quakers) and later by 
others who fought first for the abolition of the slave trade and then 
for the abolition of slavery itself. In the case of apartheid, many 
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atheists, communists, Jews, Christians, Muslims and agnostics were 
united by their resistance to the immorality of racism and exploitation 
and their vision of a non-racial South Africa.  
But, care must be taken in adopting a moral vision as it can be dis-
torted and result in huge deception and suffering for millions, as 
seen in the later betrayal of the hopes of the 1917 Bolshevik 
revolution and the growth of Facism in Germany and Italy in the 
1930s. Therefore, the intention, means and end all ought to be di-
rected to the common good. Blind adherence to visions and the 
leader(s) who propagate them is extremely unwise. Hence, morally 
mature persons who are not easily deceived, who are aware of the 
temptations of power and who are alert to the dangers of social 
engineering are in acute demand. Thus, Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars (2000:108) speak of the social need for people who 
have both moral convictions and social attachment to prevent “perio-
dic descents into barbarity”. If leaders consciously enter a process of 
moral formation and become moral agents in their contexts, they are 
able to inspire and draw out the best in other people and persuade 
them to participate in realising a genuinely moral vision.  
Moral agency is formed over a period of time. Shutte (2008a:22-32) 
speaks of the importance, for both the West and Africa, of forming 
persons who can become deciding and acting subjects. For Afri-
cans, a person who has seriti is respected by the community as 
being morally wise. Like a live electrical wire, aura or magnetic field 
such persons exude “force or energy” (Setiloane, 1986:13-14) in 
relationship with others and the world. This is a form of “personal 
causality” (Shutte, 2008a:30) or moral agency. What is required of 
“persons-in-community”, then, is the growth of ubuntu, a full and 
morally positive humanness, leading to what Mkhize (2008:35) 
terms “an ethical human being”. 
Christian moral agents are those who are themselves in a process 
of moral formation. They are open to the reproof and correction of 
God, their conscience and the Christian community. As the re-
deemed children of God, Christians ought to individually and collec-
tively act in morally healing and responsible ways. They can provide 
prophetic witness or counter-cultural critique (e.g. exposing and 
resisting deceit, corruption, injustice and the abuse of power) and 
constructively engage in society (e.g. reforming immoral policies and 
laws and acting to change oppressive circumstances). Christian 
moral agents, then, are individuals or groups that exercise an ethic 
of responsibility (Koopman & Vosloo, 2002) in order to facilitate 
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moral, relational development in persons and moral social transfor-
mation.  
Finally, moral agency needs to be extended to others. Christians are 
called to proclaim and enact the liberation of Christ. Those who are 
slaves, victims, and perpetual minors (e.g. women in certain cul-
tures) are not free to decide or choose. When people are ignored, 
coerced and terrorised, they are dehumanised and their human 
agency is limited or destroyed. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, 
studies have shown that 60-80% of married African women who are 
infected with HIV and AIDS, have had only had one sexual partner – 
their husbands (UNAIDS et al., 2004:16).1 Those who are dehu-
manised by others need to experience the inner moral healing and 
freedom that only God and a loving moral community can bring. 
Further, the cultural, economic and political structures that hold them 
in bondage need to be challenged and changed. 
Space does not permit a full discussion in this article of how moral 
agency develops (cf. Connors & McCormick, 1998; Curran, 2004; 
Kretzschmar, 2007:18-36). Rather, it seeks to identify the effect of 
cultural value preferences (an aspect of socialisation) and the role of 
personal choice. In other words, what combination of cultural socia-
lisation and personal internalisation of values affect the moral agen-
cy of people in a pluralistic society? 
3. A model of cultural value preferences 
Culture can be broadly understood as an integral system which ex-
emplifies the values, beliefs, customs and institutions of a particular 
community, or group of communities. Culture is the way a people 
have organised themselves to express and preserve their identity 
and way of life.  
Below I reflect on the development and exercise of moral agency 
using the model of the six dimensions of cultural value preferences 
as developed by Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000:11).2 In 
                                      
1 UNAIDS (United Nations Joint Programme on HIV and AIDS), UNFPA (United 
Nations Population Fund) and UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for 
Women). 
2 An earlier, ground-breaking set of categorisations was that of Hofstede (2001: 
234-248) who identified the following five values: power distance, individualism 
versus collectivism, assertiveness versus modesty (originally termed masculine 
versus feminine), uncertainty avoidance, and short-term orientation versus long-
term orientation. 
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another volume Trompenaars (1993:63-72) uses an additional cate-
gorisation of cultures that are neutral (feelings are hidden) or affec-
tive (feelings are shown).3 In the interests of clarity and brevity I 
have decided to use the Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000) 
model, but will occasionally refer to other categories, such as “power 
distance” (the way in which persons at different social levels relate 
to each other), where it is relevant to the argument. A summary of 
the model that is used can be outlined as follows: 
Table 1: The six dimensions of cultural diversity  
(Adapted from Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 
2000:11; cf. Schubert, 2008:57-88) 
1. Universalism 
Rules, codes, laws, and generalisa-
tions.  
General principles, rules, and codes 
that apply to persons in all circum-
stances. 
Particularism 
Exceptions, special circumstances, 
unique relations. Particular circum-
stances are taken into account when 
making decisions, thus exceptions can 
more easily be made. 
2. Individualism 
Personal freedom, human rights, com-
petitiveness. The focus is placed on 
the individual person. The interests, 
thoughts and decisions of the indivi-
dual are of primary importance. The 
individual is expected to take respons-
ibility for him-/herself and to be self-
reliant. Competition is regarded as 
healthy, and persons need to take 
actions that will lead to their own 
development and fulfilment. 
Communitarianism 
Social responsibility, harmonious re-
lations, co-operation. The interests, 
thoughts and decisions of the group 
prevail over those of the individual. 
Individuals are expected to co-operate 
and defer to more senior members of 
the group, and promote the values and 
well-being of the group. The legacy or 
tradition of the society is important. 
 
3. Specificity 
Atomistic, reductive analytical, object-
tive. Public spaces are considered to 
be large and other people can be 
directly engaged. Individuals commu-
nicate specific information, and their 
reactions are shown openly and pre-
cisely, even bluntly. Transparency is 
important. 
Diffusion 
Holistic, elaborative, synthetic, relatio-
nal. Specific information is less easily 
shared. People tend to be indirect, 
tactful, and even ambiguous. Yet, mul-
tiple areas of life and personal context 
need to be related to in a diffuse 
manner. Information is not shared until 
trust is developed. 
                                      
3 Later, House et al. (2004) identified nine categories: performance orientation, 
future orientation, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, power distance, humane 
orientation, uncertainty avoidance, institutional collectivism and in-group col-
lectivism. 
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4. Achieved status 
What you’ve done, your track record. 
Appointments to certain positions are 
on the basis of personal accomplish-
ments. Skills and achievement are 
important. 
Ascribed status 
Who you are, your potential and con-
nections. A person is given a certain 
position based on age, or social posi-
tion. Reputation and status are im-
portant. 
5. Inner direction 
Conscience, convictions and virtue are 
located and motivated from inside. 
Societies tend to control their en-
vironment and nature itself can be 
controlled. The convictions, will and 
deliberate actions of people can 
change their circumstances. 
Outer direction 
Moral examples and influences are 
located and motivated from outside. 
These societies adjust to their cir-
cumstances. The rhythms and forces 
of nature cannot be changed and 
human relationships must be valued 
and conflict avoided. 
6. Sequential time 
Time is a race along a set course. 
Time is perceived as succession or a 
line and should not be wasted. These 
societies are future and goal orient-
tated, change is more easily accepted. 
Synchronous time 
Time is a dance of fine co-ordinations. 
These societies are event orientated. 
The past is an important part of the 
present. Change is accepted only if 
this legacy is not destroyed. Time is 
circular, and because situations and 
opportunities can be repeated, actions 
are less urgent. 
Prior to reflecting on this model, some important preliminary points 
need to be made.  
Firstly, the twelve polarities noted above are not disconnected oppo-
sites; they may function as a continuum. Thus, a person’s moral 
decision making processes often require both universalism (e.g. the 
moral norm that “murder is wrong”) and particularism (taking into ac-
count any mitigating circumstances). It is essential to be able to 
“perceive and think in both directions” (Hampden-Turner & Trom-
penaars, 2000:3), thereby optimising the strengths of different 
cultures.  
Secondly, these general tendencies ought not to be regarded as ab-
solutes because cultures are not static. In many instances, certain 
western cultural groupings (eg. American, British, German and white 
South African) are representative of categories in the first column 
whereas African (Black South African) as well as Japanese, Chinese 
and French cultures are all representative of certain categories in 
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the second column (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000:71).4 
However, exposure to cultures different to one’s own can signi-
ficantly influence and alter one’s cultural value orientations. Thus 
many South Africans have, especially since 1994, made strides in 
incorporating insights and values from those of different cultural 
groups.  
Thirdly, these twelve cultural preferences cannot be said to be mo-
rally right or good in themselves. Each preference has a role to play 
and has developed in relation to societal circumstances and needs 
in different historical periods. Thus, in a fast-changing, industrial 
context, achieved status, sequential time and inner direction and 
motivation are valued because it is necessary to employ skilled staff 
who use time effectively and are able to control natural elements in 
an industrial process.  
Finally, we need to ask whether a model that is based on pairs of 
opposites can offer insight into questions being asked within a 
holistic African context. Why is it the case that, despite the stress on 
the holism and harmony of African culture, ethics and theology (e.g. 
Kudadjie, 1996; Richardson, 1996a; 1996b; 2009; Kunhiyob, 2008), 
the basic needs of the community as a whole are not being met in 
many African countries (Mugambi & Nasimiyu-Wasike, 1999:4-8)? 
Why have leaders such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe been 
permitted by other African leaders to bring the people of an entire 
country to their knees? Why are many post-independent African 
“elites” permitted to openly pursue a greedy, selfish and sometimes 
corrupt lifestyle which is contrary to the values of African ethics? I 
argue that the Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars model not only 
provides insight into cultural perceptions and values, but precisely 
because these pairs of polarities need to be held in tension, 
promotes a holistic understanding of human existence. 
4. Moral agency: cultural pathways and pitfalls 
I do not simply compare and contrast cultural or other value orien-
tations, this has been done elsewhere (eg. Van Rensburg, 2007:39-
65; Painter-Morland, 2001:15-25). My aim is to show how these pre-
ferences provide insight on certain current events and controversies 
that affect Southern African societies. I also argue that cultural pre-
                                      
4 Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars hardly mention Africa. In this article I relate 
their model to some elements of the South African context, based on my own 
experience and research. 
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ferences should not be blindly perpetuated without considering 
changing social circumstances. When cultures are in collision, flexi-
bility and mutual respect can enable such cultures to benefit from 
each other’s insights. What is required is not simply balance, but an 
awareness of one’s own cultural blindness and the need for a 
creative tension in which both polarities are valued. However, when 
this tension is not maintained, cultural values are inappropriately 
applied, certain cultural tendencies are taken to an extreme, and 
where these extreme tendencies are combined, the result is a moral 
imbalance that is detrimental to the common good of the members 
of a pluralistic society. Moral agents and leaders ought to be able to 
identify such distortions and suggest ways of moving beyond cultural 
impasses. 
4.1 Universalism and particularism 
Universalism can be a moral pathway in that it focuses on norms 
and values that can be widely, if not globally, endorsed. This has led 
to the establishment of the United Nations, the International Court 
that sits in the Hague and numerous codes of business ethics. For 
example, the third King Report on Governance for South Africa 
(2009:21) lists the following four ethical values as essential to good 
practice: responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency. 
Universalism insists on equality before the law, so that all the mem-
bers of a society can be treated in the same way. If universal moral 
norms are fairly applied, those who are rich, powerful and corrupt, 
for instance, will not escape justice.  
Particularism can be a moral pathway in that it appreciates local 
customs and takes particular situations and needs into account. 
Considering motive, mitigating circumstances, a possible conflict of 
duties, a full consideration of the situation, and the possible conse-
quences of a particular action, can mean that a wise assessment is 
made and the best possible action taken.  
Universalism also has its moral pitfalls. Those who over-emphasise 
and distort universalism forget the importance of cultural diversity, 
local insights and the freedom of other nations. For example, on the 
basis of perceived cultural, racial or ideological superiority, several 
western nations colonised much of Latin America, Africa and Asia, 
thereby furthering their national and economic interests and im-
posing their values and institutions through military, socio-economic, 
political and cultural means. The communist imperialism inspired by 
Marxism also imposed its rule on many nations in Europe and in-
fluenced some African nations. More recently, economic neo-colo-
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nialism and globalisation have impacted negatively on the econo-
mies of African and other developing countries (Stiglitz, 2003:7-18), 
often with the connivance of corrupt local leaders. Recently, some 
have spoken of the richly resourced continent of Africa as being on 
China’s shopping list (Temkin, 2009). 
Particularism also has its moral pitfalls. In South Africa, a long-
standing rejection of unjust laws has encouraged an ongoing 
rejection of even valid, jointly endorsed laws, such as traffic laws. In 
addition, when distorted or over-emphasised, specific circumstances 
and loyalty to a particular person, party or group take precedence 
over what is right. One recent example of this distortion of particu-
larism was the brutal xenophobic treatment of African foreigners in 
South Africa in 2008. These attacks, on fellow Africans, suggested 
that the oft quoted moral and cultural principle of ubuntu does not 
extend to the entire continent, but primarily towards the members of 
one’s own particular ethnic group, clan, family or local community.5 
Suspicion of foreigners, combined with envy, competition for jobs, 
criminality and dire poverty, resulted in an explosion of violence that 
disregarded universal moral considerations for the protection of life, 
livelihood and property. 
When combined with a distorted communitarianism (see 4.2), the 
cultural preference of particularism is to bow to group interest, patro-
nage, or the will of a particular leader or group of leaders, rather 
than adhere to general moral principles. Thus, particularists may be 
unwilling to break ranks and expose an action committed by some-
one from within their own group on the basis of an external moral 
principle.6 One example of what may be regarded as a distortion of 
particularism is the decision of the NPA (National Prosecuting Agen-
cy) in April 2009, not to investigate corruption charges against Jacob 
Zuma, who has since become the South African President. This was 
after a protracted legal process dating back to June 2005 when his 
close financial advisor, Schabir Shaik was found guilty of corruption 
                                      
5 Munyaka and Motlhabi (2008:75-83) discuss factors that have weakened the 
moral effect of ubuntu. 
6 Important exceptions include African women theologians (Phiri et al., 2002) who 
have criticised the patriarchy of African cultures, prophets such as Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu who have criticised several African leaders; and activists such as 
Ken Saro Wiwa (Nigeria) and Wangari Maathai (Kenya). A study of leadership in 
Tanzania showed that younger people are also more critical of their leaders 
(Schubert, 2008:142) and Chitando (2008:50-56) critiques “oppressive masculi-
nities”. 
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and fraud. Consequently, the citizens of South Africa were left in the 
dark as to the innocence or guilt of Zuma.  
4.2 Individualism and communitarianism 
Both the individual person and the community are important in rela-
tion to moral agency. Hence I disagree with Hampton-Turner and 
Trompenaars’s categorisations of individualism and communitarian-
ism. These, I believe, are a distortion of the creative tension of a ne-
cessary focus on both the individual and the community. As already 
noted, the stress on the personal moral responsibility of an individual 
is an important pathway of moral agency, as it is primarily as per-
sons that we perceive, decide and act. Individualism, then, is an 
overemphasis or distortion of the importance of the individual. Self-
reliance will benefit the strong and able, but little value will be 
attached to the weak, old and disabled. In European, American and 
increasingly in African cities poor, homeless, lost and sick adults and 
children beg on the streets. Both their individual dignity and their 
sense of belonging have been drastically impaired; they have been 
abandoned and “cast out”. In an increasingly postmodern context, 
mutual support and communal obligations are not emphasised. 
As with individualism, communitarianism or collectivism has very 
definite moral pitfalls.7 Where the acceptance of the value of the 
community degenerates into collectivism, it results in the interests of 
one group, be it defined according to ethnicity, nation, class or 
gender, being advantaged over another. Instead of a moral commu-
nity promoting the common good, the short term self interest of a 
particular group is promoted. Hence countries such as Kenya, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia and the Sudan are torn by ethnic conflict. 
Communitarianism further leads to nepotism (promotion of the in-
terests of family members), “jobs for pals” (promoting the interests of 
friends and supporters), misplaced (blind) loyalties to clan or family 
members, uncritical political patronage and an absence of personal 
moral accountability (Kretzschmar, 2008:85-90). Powerful, small col-
lectives (or oligarchies) protect and advance those individuals who 
promote their interests. Often, those at the lower levels of society 
will not see it as their place or role to challenge their superiors, even 
if they suffer at the hands of these leaders (Nürnberger, 2007:195). 
Consequently, the abuse of power is perpetuated. 
                                      
7 Cf. Shutte (2008:27-28) for a critique of European collectivism. 
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Metz (2008:335-356) recognises the obligations of kinship and ar-
gues that a “moderate partialism” (which rejects nepotism but ac-
cepts affirmative action) is morally acceptable. But, he rejects 
“strong partialism” (which benefits close relatives and other indivi-
duals) on the grounds that it fails to benefit the community or 
population as a whole and leads to division, suspicion and civil 
unrest. 
De Maria (2008:357-374) also notes the powerful kinship obligations 
owed by Africans to their “primorial public”.8 He speaks of the West 
African context, which is characterised by “the crisis of the African 
state; the underpayment of public servants; and the stream of 
foreign aid ending up in elite coffers” (De Maria, 2008:370). Quoting 
other writers such as Ekeh (1975) and De Sardan (1999) he argues 
that there is “no shared and internalised conception of the public 
domain” (De Maria, 2008:370). This lack of moral recognition of a 
civil public means that many individuals share the perception that 
personal benefits can legitimately be squeezed out of public coffers 
and offices. 
These insights of Metz and De Maria concerning cultural and kinship 
loyalties and the dangers of “strong partialism” are important. They 
reinforce the argument of this article that cultural values that are 
distorted and inappropriately applied to a 21st century African con-
text exacerbate rather than solve political and economic problems. 
Their insights also act as timely warnings to South Africans.  
4.3 Specificity and diffusion 
Specificity is a moral pathway in the sense that issues are clearly 
identified and analysed. For communication, being clear and direct 
is important. Because the power distance in the West is generally 
less than is the case in Africa, specificity is permitted, even 
encouraged. In terms of moral agency and transformation, clear, 
accurate analysis and the communication of what is wrong and who 
is responsible is necessary before change can be effected. 
Diffuseness is a moral pathway in the sense that it can enhance 
human relationships and trust. In Africa, a direct and blunt way of 
speaking would be considered to be rude, discussion tends to be 
circular with tact and indirect comment being valued and con-
                                      
8 De Maria (2008a:357-365) is very critical of the interests and perceptions that 
drive western critiques of corruption in Africa. 
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frontation avoided. In a small, closely knit community, this preserves 
harmony. 
Specificity becomes a pitfall when it is unwise and insensitive. For 
example, in a conflict resolution context, it is important to say the 
right thing in the right way at the right time. As the book of Proverbs 
puts it, “A soft answer turns away wrath, but a harsh word stirs up 
anger. The tongue of the wise dispenses knowledge, but the mouths 
of fools pour out folly.” (Prov. 15:1-2.)9 Similarly, in a counselling 
context, specificity may need to be softened and certainly reserved 
for the right moment. When linked to individualism, specificity 
damages social relationships and trust and, when linked to outer 
direction (see below), overly technocratic perceptions of reality ride 
roughshod over human needs and relationships and over creation 
as a whole. Thus, moral agents need to choose their words well and 
act both rightly and wisely in order to advance the good in a social 
arena or moral insight in an inter-personal situation. 
Diffuseness also has its pitfalls. In a situation of conflict, clarity and 
speaking out may be vital to its resolution. Sometimes, confrontation 
is necessary to bring healing to relationships or radical changes in 
social perceptions and practices. Diffuseness prevents truth being 
spoken in dysfunctional families, thereby allowing violence and 
sexual abuse to be perpetuated. It permits silence about HIV and 
AIDS infections, causing the virus to spread quickly through the 
population. Diffuseness, when linked to particularism, as in the case 
of Zuma as previously noted, confuses and obscures issues rather 
than identifying and solving them. 
When combined with a great power distance, communitarianism, 
and a shame orientated culture, diffusion serves to protect from 
exposure even those leaders in government, business or civil 
society that have been proven to be corrupt and incompetent. To 
add insult to injury, they are often quietly transferred to wreak havoc 
elsewhere, promoted or given a golden handshake. Members of 
universalist, individually orientated and specific cultures regard this 
as lack of responsibility (refusal to acknowledge guilt), accountability 
(being answerable) and transparency (being open). 
                                      
9 All biblical quotations are taken from the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV). 
L. Kretzschmar 
Koers 75(3) 2010:567-588  581 
4.4 Achieved and ascribed status  
Achieved status focuses on competence and skills which make the 
maintenance of large and complex social organisations possible. 
Hence, in western cultures one’s suitability for a job is assessed 
mainly on the basis of qualifications, skills and experience. In short, 
competence is more important than connections. (This does not 
mean that “jobs for pals and relatives” does not occur, but it will not 
be publically defended). Achieved status becomes a moral pathway 
if leaders respond to dire social needs, acknowledge that they are 
responsible to perform specified tasks and exhibit professionalism 
and commitment. In an African context, competent, committed and 
honest public officials can make a huge difference to the lives of 
millions of people and prevent a country from becoming a “failed 
state”, as in the case of Somalia. 
Ascribed status can be a moral pathway in that parents, children, 
friends, the sick, handicapped and aged, for example, will be valued 
for who they are rather than what success they may have achieved 
in life. Ascribed status takes into account the dignity, wisdom and 
contribution of ordinary people and it values families, communities 
and relationships.  
In western societies, where success, fame and youthful attractive-
ness are admired, the moral pitfalls of achievement-orientation are 
that ordinary, older and unattractive people may be viewed as worth-
less, has-beens. In a “lean and mean” business environment, em-
ployees are easily dismissed. Companies prefer to employ staff on a 
contract basis, yet expect commitment and production on a 24/7 
basis. An over-emphasis on achievement can turn individuals into 
labour units and workaholics. This contributes to an insecure, 
threatened and uncaring work environment, the disappearance of 
genuine family life, huge stress, and resultant mental and other 
health problems. Combined with individualism, a distortion of 
achieved status exhibits a lack of appreciation for whole human 
beings, a balanced life, and a sense of communal belonging. 
Where ascribed status has been combined with communitarianism 
and affirmative action, as in South Africa, the pitfalls are obvious. 
Especially in the civil service, being black and/or well connected is 
often regarded as sufficient qualification to obtain a particular job, 
even if one has neither the education, training, skills, experience or 
competence to do the work at hand. Under the guise of trans-
formation, the field is wide open for nepotism and favouritism. The 
effect on the delivery of services, for example, in the police service, 
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hospitals and local government has been disastrous. For instance, 
of the 283 local municipalities in South Africa, only 2% received a 
clean audit report for 2009 (Hofstatter, 2010). Government officials 
often fail to deliver basic services and frustrate the efforts of those 
who are struggling to survive and those seeking to assist them. This 
leads to protests such as those of the inhabitants of the town of 
Balfour in Mpumalanga, especially during August 2009, against lack 
of efficiency and delivery on the part of elected local government 
officials (Anon., 2009).  
In moral terms, when wrong actions or irresponsibility are rewarded, 
and honest, committed service is ignored or punished, individual 
moral consciousness, relationships and society begin to disinter-
grate. Contrary to the goals of an African ethic, trust and co-
operation are replaced with suspicion and manipulation, and social 
conflict replaces community co-operation.  
4.5 Inner direction and outer direction 
Inner direction focuses on personal responsibility and is based on a 
perception of the world as a place that can be managed and 
changed. Those western societies that have formed relatively stable 
politico-economic entities, and have established a degree of mastery 
over natural forces, tend to be inner directed. Water can be pumped 
to where it is needed, houses can be heated and people can be 
inoculated against diseases. Such successes create “can do” 
societies which believe that difficulties can be overcome by the 
consistent and personal application of knowledge, technology and 
effort. A focus on inner conscience, virtue and initiative creates the 
possibilities for prophetic critiques and counter-cultural initiatives. In 
terms of moral agency, this confidence and hope are important to 
sustain moral effort in difficult circumstances. 
Whereas in western societies, the self is seen as something private 
inside one, in Africa  
… the self is outside the body, present and open to all. This is 
because the self is the expression of all the forces acting upon 
it. It is not a thing, but the sum total of all the interacting forces 
(Shutte, 2008b:90).  
Thus, those in outer directed cultures recognise that one is not 
always in control of one’s natural environment; one responds to 
external events. Events such as floods and droughts occur, and 
have to be survived rather than controlled. The experience, wisdom 
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and needs of the group guide action. Sometimes dysfunctional 
social systems or institutions have to be endured and it is the social 
resilience of the bond of the group that make not only survival but 
continued humanity and generosity possible. Together with affect-
ivity, the small but important joys of life like laughter, human 
togetherness, a meal, a warm bed, music and dance can be enjoyed 
and the suffering of the present can be temporarily forgotten. 
Together with the perception of time as synchronous, the hope that 
things will change and improve, provide the necessary strength to 
overcome suffering. 
Inner direction can be distorted in that action and power are valued 
above being and mutual respect. As noted earlier, when combined 
with a distorted individualism and specificity, inner direction has 
resulted in the destructive exercise of power and knowledge. Un-
considered and selfish industrial and technological processes, for 
example, have resulted in life-threatening, global environmental de-
gradation. In moral terms one species is selfishly and short-sightedly 
consuming the environment and well-being of every other living 
specie. In Christian terms, this is a distorted view of God, humanity 
and creation.  
In outer directed societies, the focus is on being and there is 
insufficient stress on doing. Because of the perception that one’s life 
is affected by circumstances beyond one’s control, there is little ini-
tiative to make things happen. This leads to a more passive ap-
proach to life which is a serious obstacle to moral agency, and which 
impedes taking personal and communal responsibility. In a tradi-
tionalist setting, where authority is stressed, innovation and indepen-
dent action may be regarded with suspicion. “One is not supposed 
to take responsibility beyond one’s strictly defined sphere of com-
petence.” (Nürnberger, 2007:176, 190.)  
When combined with ascribed status, obtaining a job becomes the 
pinnacle of achievement, not the responsibilities attached to that job. 
Telephones, for example, can ring for over an hour in government 
offices, because a sense of personal responsibility, initiative and 
commitment are absent. When combined with a distorted com-
munitarianism, children are socialised to conform. As adults, they 
may become passive and fearful, and wait for instructions. However, 
from a Christian moral perspective, both sins of commission (what 
we do) and sins of omission (what we fail to do) render us morally 
culpable before God. 
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4.6 Sequential and synchronous time 
Westerners have a strong sense that “time is flying” and that it ought 
to be used well. This results in efficiency. Their days are conceived 
of as consisting of a certain number of hours, minutes and even 
seconds. Having been exposed to industrial processes, complex 
systems of administration, written communications and precise 
scientific analysis in their cultural experience, many are familiar with 
planning and executive responsibilities. What our societies need are 
leaders that can both plan for the long term and aspire to be 
responsible (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000:330). 
Africans have a far better sense of the present moment and of 
circular processes of time. Much time is spent in developing or nur-
turing family and other relationships. Important (and recurring) 
events such as births and weddings are celebrated at length with 
verve and joy. Events and relationships can be fully enjoyed without 
a sense of needing to rush off to complete some or other task. 
In moral terms, when the preference for sequential time is over-em-
phasised, human beings become slaves to time. Life becomes 
rushed and processed rather than savoured and enjoyed. Living 
under pressure, the vital question of “what is the moral value of what 
I am doing” may not even be asked by Westerners. In their focus on 
chronos (measured time) they may not notice the kairos (a key 
moment) and be unable to stop, as Jesus did, and meet the needs 
of those He met while “on the way” (eg. Mark 5:21-34; 10:46-52; and 
John 4:4-10). When combined with being reserved and a cultural 
neutrality (when reason is separated from emotion), Westerners can 
be experienced by those from affective and synchronous time 
cultures as cold, uncaring and purely task-focused.  
The perception of time as purely synchronous can also lead to moral 
distortions. Relaxed and lengthy conversations replace service deli-
very, diligence and professionalism. Deadlines are not met and 
goals not achieved because the focus is on the present moment and 
not the sequence of events. Hence planning, managerial efficiency 
and organisational processes are neglected. When linked to 
ascribed status, services are not delivered to needy people, busi-
ness contracts remain unfulfilled, jobs are lost and endless numbers 
of people are unjustly treated, frustrated or ignored.  
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5. Conclusion 
I have argued that in order for the moral transformation of persons 
and the moral renewal of society to take place, attention needs to be 
given to what moral agency is. For a Christian, moral agency is the 
desire to be a good person and, enabled by God, the growing ability 
to do what is right, both in one’s personal life and in one’s social 
interactions and responsibilities. 
Both western and African societies are immersed in a moral crisis. 
Moral uncertainty, the abuse of power, and the failure to act in 
morally appropriate ways are common. A nuanced analysis of the 
strengths and weaknesses of both western and African cultures 
must be embarked upon if culture is to help rather than hinder in the 
construction of moral persons and communities.  
The twelve cultural values and tendencies discussed above reveal 
that each can be a moral pathway. However, these values need to 
be equally appreciated, held in a creative tension, and wisely 
applied given the needs of different circumstances. When these ten-
dencies are over-emphasised and thereby distorted, a moral imba-
lance results. Even more important, when distorted value prefe-
rences are combined with other distorted preferences, moral break-
down is the result.  
From a Christian perspective, universal moral norms and values 
need to be balanced by a consideration of particular circumstances. 
To achieve moral renewal in society it is necessary to develop in-
dividual moral character, convictions, commitment, courage, deci-
sion making and action, guided by a moral vision. Equally, commit-
ment to genuine community and the growth of moral communities 
that can nurture individuals and give rise to concerted moral action 
are vital. Specific cultures are concerned with truth and a clear 
perception of the realities of life whereas diffuse cultures seek to 
promote harmonious relationships. But no individual or community 
can thrive when relationships are abused or destroyed or where 
confusion and manipulation are promoted. What is required in our 
society is a focus on achievement, knowledge and skills for the 
performance of tasks on the one hand and, on the other hand, to 
ascribe value to people as human beings created in the image of 
God, however marred that image may have become. Inner direction 
is crucially important in the formation of moral agency because 
personal responsibility and initiative are required. In addition, the 
recognition within outer directed cultures of communal belonging, 
group wisdom and an awareness of the rhythms of creation are vital. 
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However, it is necessary to counteract passive dependency on 
authoritarian leaders. Finally, two of the words commonly used for 
time in the New Testament, chronos (sequential time, e.g. Luke 
1:57; 8:27) and kairos (the appointed, proper, opportune or 
synchronous time, e.g. Mark 1:15; 13:33; 1 Peter 5:6) indicate the 
importance of both perceptions of time. 
This means that cultural tendencies and values need to be held in 
tension to ensure the common good rather than the benefit of a few. 
Certainly, cultural value distortions need to be exposed and resisted. 
Both African and western cultures can benefit from self critique and 
external critique. The danger is defensiveness and “denialism”, 
where all aspects of one’s own culture are romanticised and pro-
tected. Individual Christians and the churches as local, national and 
international moral communities can play a significant role in both 
exposing cultural distortions and promoting cultural values that are 
morally beneficial to the societies in which we live. 
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